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Abstract: As part of its climate strategy, the EU aims at increasing the share of electricity 
from renewable energy sources (RES-E) in overall electricity generation. Attaining this 
target poses a considerable challenge as the electricity sector is “locked” into a  
carbon-intensive system, which hampers the adoption of RES-E technologies. Electricity 
generation, transmission and distribution grids as well as storage and demand response are 
subject to important path dependences, which put existing, non-renewable energy sources 
at an advantage. This paper examines how an EU framework for RES-E support policies 
should be designed to facilitate a carbon lock-out. For this purpose, we specify the major 
technological, economic and institutional barriers to RES-E. For each of the barriers, a 
policy review is carried out which assesses the performance of existing policy instruments 
and identifies needs for reform. The review reveals several shortcomings: while policies 
targeting generation are widely in place, measures to address barriers associated with 
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electricity grids, storage and demand are still in their infancy and have to be extended. 
Moreover, the implementation of policies has been fragmented across EU Member States. 
In this respect, national policies should be embedded into an integrated EU-wide planning 
of the RES-E system with overarching energy scenarios and partially harmonized  
policy rules.  
Keywords: carbon lock-in; demand management; electricity; energy policy; feed-in tariff; 
electricity generation; grids; renewable energy sources; storage 
 
1. Introduction 
Using renewable energy sources is a major option of climate change mitigation [1]. It also forms an 
important pillar of the EU’s climate strategy. By 2020, at least 20% of the EU’s final energy 
consumption shall be provided by renewable energy sources [2]. This implies that electricity from 
renewable energy sources (RES-E) has to provide at least 37% of overall electricity generation [3], up 
from 13% in 1990 and 18% in 2008 [4]. Figure 1 illustrates that RES-E generation has grown in most 
EU countries in the last two decades. But the growth rates diverge across EU countries, and the 
ambitious 2020 targets are in jeopardy. Albeit virtually all EU Member States have implemented  
RES-E support policies [5], important barriers have limited their success up to now. The electricity 
sector is “locked” into a carbon-intensive system: A variety of technological, economic and institutional 
patterns of the system favour the use of fossil energy sources and hamper the adoption of RES-E 
technologies [6]. These considerations raise several questions: Have existing RES-E policies been 
designed properly to promote a carbon lock-out? Do they address all relevant barriers to RES-E 
adoption? Are RES-E policies sufficiently coordinated among another? A re-evaluation is also required 
as RES-E support schemes have recently been bashed for being ineffective and inefficient instruments 
of climate policy, suggesting that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) alone provides for an 
efficient attainment of climate targets and will induce sufficient levels of RES-E adoption [7–9].  
This paper specifies the characteristics of the carbon lock-in and highlights major barriers to RES-E 
adoption related to electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and storage and demand response. 
These obstacles cannot be overcome by the EU ETS alone and require a well-defined set of additional 
policies. To specify this portfolio, a policy review is carried for each of the barriers. The review assesses 
the effectiveness and efficiency of existing policies to address the different barriers and identifies 
needs for policy reforms. The analysis reveals that existing policies primarily target barriers associated 
with RES-E generation, even though these measures can still be improved. In turn, barriers related to 
electricity transmission and distribution and storage and demand management have been largely 
neglected. Here the policy portfolio has to be extended significantly. What is more, the implementation 
of policy measures has been quite fragmented across Member States. National policies have to be 
embedded into an integrated EU-wide planning of the RES-E system with overarching energy 
scenarios and partially harmonised policy rules. 
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Figure 1. Share of gross electricity consumption generated from renewable energy  
sources [4]. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 specifies the basic characteristics of path dependency 
and carbon lock-in in the electricity sector. Subsequently, Sections 3 to 5 outline the barriers associated 
with electricity generation, grids and storage and demand response, which contribute to the carbon 
lock-in, and review the corresponding policies. Section 6 addresses overarching integration requirements. 
Section 7 summarizes the major needs for policy reform and discusses how the corresponding transition 
process can be spurred. 
2. Path Dependence and Carbon Lock-In in the Electricity Sector 
With more than a century of experience and build-up infrastructure, fossil fuels display numerous 
advantages for business on business-relevant time scales compared to RES-E technologies. This path 
dependence produces a carbon lock-in [6]. A path dependence is the result of contingence and 
increasing returns to scales favouring a certain technology or country without being intrinsically 
superior to alternatives. Path dependence is by itself neither good nor bad. A carbon lock-in is the 
result of a specific path dependence favouring fossil-fuel technologies over low-carbon alternatives. 
Increasing returns to scale by infrastructure provision (e.g., gas pipelines) and agglomeration economics 
(clustering around the cheapest source of fuel, e.g., in the Ruhr area) are factors fostering path 
dependence [10]. Sunk investments, or more generally, long-liveability of capital stock create further 
inertia in the energy system [10,11]. The key reason for a carbon lock-in is non-responsiveness of 
markets with respect to inter-temporal externalities: Imperfect foresight, uncertainty on future fuel 
prices and on post-2020 climate targets and policies produce systematic underinvestment in research 
and development (R&D) of effective abatement technologies. This is a catch-22: Without these new 
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technologies, stricter emission reduction targets may be considered impossible to meet by government, 
industry and the general public [12]. A carbon lock-in needs to be overcome by a carbon lock-out if the 
social costs of fossil fuels are assumed to outweigh its advantages. Crucially, the inter-temporal character 
of the carbon lock-in requires inter-temporal policies, addressing the specific lock-in dimensions. A 
stationary price instrument, such as the EU ETS, is insufficient [13–15].  
Barriers associated with renewable energy generation, grids and storage and demand responses 
constitute specific carbon lock-ins. Rather than ranking barriers and their policy responses, we suggest 
addressing them simultaneously. The following sections will discuss these specific barriers, and review 
appropriate policy responses.  
3. Generation 
3.1. Learning and Knowledge Spillovers 
3.1.1. Definition of Barriers 
Crucial factors contributing to a carbon lock-in are learning effects and corresponding knowledge 
spillovers [13]. The combination of technological learning curves and knowledge in the production of 
a homogeneous good (electricity) is in fact sufficient to produce path dependence. Technological 
learning (e.g., worker experience, standardisation and specialisation) provides for unit production costs 
to shrink with increased cumulative output [16]. Established technologies profit from this learning 
curve effect and economies of scale and can deter competitors from the market entry [17].  
Over the last decade, learning effects have led to significant cost decreases of RES-E technologies 
such as wind, photovoltaics or concentrated solar power [18–20]. One may presume that they will be 
able to compete with fossil fuel technologies at some point in future. It is questionable, though, 
whether this point will be reached in due time. This is primarily due to adverse effects of knowledge 
spillovers. The knowledge gain of a specific firm emerging from learning-by-doing or R&D activities 
is usually also available to rival firms to a certain extent, for instance, due to a lack of nondisclosure or 
patenting, fluctuation of employees or cooperation between firms [16,21]. Consequently, innovating 
and learning firms cannot reap the entire social profits of their knowledge. From a macro-economic 
point of view, a single firm therefore invests too little in learning and R&D, because it only accounts 
for its own profits, but not for those of its competitors. This also implies that investments in fossil-fuel 
technologies are excessive, which is particularly detrimental in terms of efficiency as many of these 
investments are irreversible and sunk [13]. 
3.1.2. Policy Review 
The major policy instrument to address learning and knowledge spillovers are schemes to subsidize 
RES-E generation [13,22,23]. In the EU, feed-in tariffs (FITs) have always been competing with 
(tradable) RES-E quota systems. Many analysts agree that FIT systems have been on average more 
effective than quota systems in spurring the deployment of RES-E technologies and driving down their 
learning curve [5,24–34]). For example, after 20 years of FIT support in Germany, average local prices 
for PV installations have dropped to ~2.5€ (2010)/Wp at the end of 2010, compared to about 
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~10.4€ (2010)/Wp in 1995 (calculated from PVPS “National Reports” using 2010 exchange rates  
and German CPI to correct the 1995 value) [35]. A primary reason is that FITs can be easily 
differentiated by RES-E technologies and date of construction. Thereby, they appropriately account for 
technology-related differences in learning curves and spillover effects and allow targeted support for 
innovative but not-yet-competitive technologies [31,32,36]. In contrast, quotas promote primarily 
those technologies which are closest to the market, and can bring about large rents for these 
technologies [32,37,38]. In the Swedish tradable certificate scheme, observed rents amounted to as 
much as 55–75% of the overall remuneration paid to electricity producers [39]. The non-differentiation 
between construction dates under quota systems also leads to a “dynamic disincentive to invest” in 
learning technologies: If a technology benefits from learning-by-doing and suffers from spillovers, 
there is a strong incentive to postpone an investment [25,37,40]. This is the case with policies that 
count every kWh of RES-E against the same quota, so electricity from older, more expensive plants 
gets the same remuneration as electricity from new, cheaper plants. 
A challenge associated with FITs is the uncertainty about actual deployment levels. Information 
constraints usually lead to remuneration levels that do not exactly reflect true RES-E generation costs 
and hamper the prediction of future RES-E capacity developments. On the one hand, FITs may be 
excessive, create large rents for RES-E projects and lead to high policy costs. The corresponding boom 
in RES-E investments may lead to a strong pressure to abolish the remuneration system. On the other 
hand, FITs may also turn out to be too low to attain deployment targets. Such problems are unlikely to 
occur under a quota system where the overall amount of RES-E is fixed. At least in theory, market 
trades of quotas provide for remuneration levels to adapt continuously and to approximate true RES-E 
costs over time. However, this calls for a strict enforcement of the quota, which has not always been 
the case, for example, in the United Kingdom [31].  
To control the effectiveness and efficiency of FIT systems, it is crucial to install a feedback 
mechanism which automatically and promptly adjusts the remuneration to changes in real technology 
costs [32,41,42]. First FIT feedback mechanisms are currently implemented in Germany, Spain, 
California and Oregon [42,43]. However, an early announced policy revision can lead to a “last-minute 
panic”: many investors may try to finish a project before the FIT is reduced. This drives up prices and 
increases total FIT cost. Last-minute panic strongly contributed to the 2008 boom in Spain [44] and the 
2010 boom in Germany. Consequently, a refined mechanism for responsive degression in the form of a 
“breathing cap” is needed: As a starting point, national deployment scenarios are developed for every 
single RES-E technology (see Section 6.1.). The roadmaps should cover a sufficiently long time 
horizon (at least 3–5 years) to guarantee planning security in terms of investments. Policy makers 
define technology-specific FITs according to current technology costs and create a degression scheme 
that reduces the FIT level by a certain percentage each month. Once a RES-E plant is built, its 
electricity is remunerated for 15–20 years with the fixed tariff that was valid at time of completion. All 
RES-E installations receiving a FIT have to be reported to a national coordination agency upon 
completion, thus enabling the comparison of the installed and planned capacity. In case of 
overinvestment, the FITs for all projects completed afterwards are decreased according to a 
transparent, fixed formula, e.g., í2% remuneration per 5% overcapacity. In case of underinvestment, a 
more careful approach is required to reduce the possibility of strategic behaviour of RES-E operators. 
A brief analysis has to clarify why costs did not decrease as expected, whether the causes are 
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permanent or temporary and whether they are related to remuneration or some other reason like 
bureaucratic procedures and thus could be tackled without increasing the FIT. This feedback process 
should occur at regular intervals which are chosen proportionally to the realisation time of the 
respective technology—starting from a time span of one month for photovoltaics and wind. 
Such a breathing cap gives rise to several advantages compared to most currently implemented FIT 
schemes [42,43]: It enables the policy maker to influence both current and medium-term RES-E 
deployment to a high degree. The feedback mechanism also ensures that the breathing cap closely 
follows the respective technology’s learning curve, i.e., in case of learning effects the mechanism will 
prevent major rent extractions. Thus, a least-cost achievement of the deployment roadmaps is 
approached. Through restricting overcapacity due to its short feedback cycle, the breathing cap 
moreover diminishes the “last-minute panic” to finish a project right before the adjustment date and 
avoids corresponding strong price increases before that date. The detailed capacity planning together 
with projected monthly remuneration decrease creates a credible government commitment to a stable 
long-term RES-E deployment and allows project developers to plan ahead. Using a transparent 
formula for adjusting the remuneration may further reduce policy risk for RES-E developers. Finally, 
the breathing cap establishes a common perception of future RES-E deployment on which all 
investment decisions in the electricity sector and its supply chain can be based, and thus mitigates the 
costly boom-bust cycles previously observed. 
3.2. Capital Market Restrictions 
3.2.1. Definition of Barriers 
Risk premiums required on capital markets for renewable energy projects are usually higher than 
those for fossil-fuel technologies due to higher uncertainties associated with relatively immature  
RES-E technologies and exogenous risks such as wind speed or sunshine duration [45]. Less experience 
on the lender side with RES-E technologies will also result in higher risk premiums. The lack of 
experience includes technological, operational, and regulatory questions. The relative importance of 
the risk premium is higher than for fossil-fuel technologies since most RES-E technologies are more 
capital-intensive than conventional generation [46,47]. 
In addition, the specific characteristics of RES-E investors can lead to major capital market barriers. 
They are often new and small market entrants, which cannot rely on long-lived relationships with 
banks, as do large-scale fossil-fuel companies. They can provide less security for loans, and transaction 
costs of raising capital and hedging risks may be prohibitively high for them [48]. In contrast, large 
companies have access to a different set of refinance instruments, such as issuing bonds or shares. 
3.2.2. Policy Review 
Overcoming capital market barriers is another important rationale for RES-E support schemes. In 
this respect, FITs are again superior to quota systems. FITs provide secure income streams for a certain 
period of time (usually 15–20 years). This implies high investment security for RES-E developers. 
Correspondingly, the risk premiums and security deposits required by banks are small [49,50].  
In contrast, capital costs have been significantly higher under quotas, where future remuneration levels 
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are variable and market-dependent [25,27,37,38,40,51,52]. In this respect, FITs are more suitable to 
overcome capital-market barriers and reduce RES-E deployment costs.  
3.3. Uneven Political Playing Field 
3.3.1. Definition of Barriers 
Apart from market failures, the implementation of RES-E technologies is also hampered by the 
existing political framework, which often puts fossil fuels at an undue advantage over RES-E.  
A primary distortion results from the improper design of the EU ETS. The emissions cap set as well as 
the resulting allowance price do not reflect the true damage produced by CO2 emissions, i.e., fossil 
fuels do not bear their full social costs [15]. Another essential characteristic of emissions trading 
schemes, in contrast to taxes, is a volatile emissions price [53]. In the EU ETS, price volatility has 
been significant in recent years [54,55]. Volatility increases the uncertainty (and reduces the 
profitability) of investments in new generation facilities and technologies, including those in the  
RES-E sector [56]. This is aggravated by the fact that the adjustment of the emissions cap from period 
to period is subject to a political bargaining process and per se unknown. Consequently, the EU ETS is 
unlikely to set sufficient long-term incentives to promote the necessary technology transition in the 
energy sector [15,57]. 
Apart from the EU ETS, other policy instruments also favour non-renewable energy sources. 
Substantial subsidies have been and are paid for domestic coal production within the EU. Nuclear 
energy technologies have benefited from state-funded security measures, incomplete participation in 
disposal costs and insufficient liability rules in the event of a nuclear accident [58]. Furthermore, 
research in fossil and nuclear energy technologies has profited from immense governmental  
support [18].  
Finally, barriers to RES-E deployment may also result from the sluggish liberalisation of the EU 
electricity market [59]. Dominant firms tend to invest mainly in incremental improvements of 
technologies that are currently in use rather than in fundamental technological change [60]. They may 
also use their market power to impede the entry of new competitors, operating, for example, RES-E 
installations [47]. Thus, there are fewer operating firms investing in innovation, which reduces the 
probability of a technological break-through [61]. 
3.3.2. Policy Review 
We suggest abolishing the distortions set out by the political framework: tighten the emissions cap 
under the EU ETS, introduce a price collar for the allowance price, phase-out subsidies for fossil fuels, 
and spur electricity market liberalisation. However, such modifications are often not politically 
feasible [14]. For example, large fossil-fuel generators will continue lobbying against attempts to make 
the EU cap more stringent. Given these insights, existing RES-E support schemes are also useful and 
warranted as second-best means to compensate for a politically unequal treatment of energy technologies. 
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3.4. Community Acceptance 
3.4.1. Definition of Barriers 
Low community acceptance of RES-E projects can be a further barrier. Most concerns relate to 
planning permissions for renewable energy facilities [62], but increasingly also to associated 
infrastructure, especially grids [63]. Local opponents, residents who thwart such projects, are often 
accused of NIMBYism and being emotive [64]. The “Not In My Back Yard” syndromes and Locally 
Unwanted Land Uses (or LULUs) have mainly been associated with wind farms [65–68], but also with 
biomass power plants [69–71], and even off-shore wind energy [72–74]. 
It is argued that, when NIMBYism prevails, planning consent for RES-E projects is less likely. But 
NIMBYism can be a misleading explanation for opposition against renewables [68]. Research often 
glosses over normative assumptions [75] and epistemology of acceptance issues [73,76]. Specific 
planning rules can determine to what extent aspects of acceptance influence decisions on planning 
consent [77,78]. Often, also more informal factors determine acceptance, including awareness and 
understanding of projects [65,73], fairness and trust [68,79,80], ownership of projects [78,81], scale 
and type of technology, or environmental concerns [65,82,83]. Acceptance appears highly context 
dependent [77,84]. Some, nevertheless, argue that acceptance relies on participation of local 
communities and stakeholders in the planning process [85–87], financial benefits or benefits in kind to 
local residents [81,88,89] and stable supportive networks [86].  
3.4.2. Policy Review 
Community acceptance of RES-E projects depends on how they are promoted and who is investing. 
FIT systems have resulted in a large investor base and strong local ownership of RES-E plants in many 
countries [27], because they combine investment certainty with low transaction costs for RES-E 
developers [25,36,90]. In Denmark and Germany local farmers or cooperatives are responsible for 
large shares of FIT supported RES-E [27,78,91]. Opportunities to participate also financially in  
RES-E projects can raise a community’s acceptance of RES-E facilities and reduce deployment  
costs [27,52,77,92]. Such benefits are not provided by quota systems under which investment decisions 
are subject to greater uncertainty and organisational efforts. Investors have to gather information about 
all competitors and their future investments to develop scenarios for future quota prices [38]. The 
necessity to trade quotas is a further barrier to local ownership, as required organisational learning 
favours large-scale investors and utilities. These are significant entry barriers for small-scale investors 
and explains why the number of investors can be relatively low [25,38,93,94]. 
However, community acceptance of RES-E projects not only depends on RES-E support schemes. 
Opposition can have various reasons and requires contextually sensitive approaches for their 
resolution. If selfish NIMBYism can be identified as a core reason in a locality where a project at stake 
would generate a positive social net benefit, this benefit can be used to compensate those who suffer 
costs [95]. But care has to be taken. It is suggested that financial compensation can crowd-out 
motivation for hosting locally detrimental, but socially beneficial facilities [96]. Other studies point out 
that financial compensation often lacks acceptance and compensation should be in terms of local 
public goods [97]. Such compensation in kind can, however, exacerbate local opposition [85,88]. 
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Financial compensation through tax revenues and shares in projects may be more appropriate [78,89]. 
Other measures proposed to identify optimal host regions or communities and necessary compensation 
payments, like auctions [98–100] and mechanism design approaches [101,102] find little consideration. 
They abstract from essential geographic conditions, like wind, sun, land or local demand and again, 
they can crowd-out community motivations to support RES-E more generally [96].  
Alternative siting or some form of compensation is generally necessary when RES-E projects face 
opposition. Successful development seems likely when including (potential) opposition in early 
planning stages. Motivational crowding-out and appropriateness problems of compensation measures 
can be avoided, when the measures are designed in participation with the affected parties. Largely 
successful are projects managed and financed by local citizens, which are popular in Denmark and 
Northern Germany [78]. But transparent and participative planning and decision-making is essential 
for achieving acceptance [73]. Legal conflict-resolution instruments, such as zoning, permits or 
compulsory acquisition of land can be used [103]. They may, however, provoke further resistance, if 
participation is lacking or the procedures themselves are not accepted. Zoning of priority areas for 
RES-E facilities may imply costly governance of local participation, but can save costs inflicted by 
opposition in subsequent years. 
3.5. Planning Consent and Policy Commitment 
3.5.1. Definition of Barriers 
Uncertainty and ex-ante transaction costs of gaining planning consent are major barriers for RES-E 
deployment [104–106]. Traditionally, spatial development plans preferred centralized (fossil-fuel) over 
spatially disperse (RES-E) energy generation projects [47]. Complicated and lengthy planning 
procedures, often involving many different authorities, imply larger (ex-ante) per-unit costs for  
small-scale RES-E projects than for large-scale fossil-fuel investments [3,5,34,105]. Uncertainty about 
future modifications of support schemes and other legislation around RES-E facilities, such as 
technical standards, can also deter RES-E investors and particularly suppliers of equipment [3,38,52]. 
Technology needs time to be developed and needs to comply with future legislation. Changes in 
legislation can lead to higher compliance and input costs in the future, which is mainly a concern for 
input-intensive bioenergy. Costs of compliance with planning consents, however, is much less likely to 
change during the lifespan of a project, if consents are legally secure. 
3.5.2. Policy Review 
Removing these barriers can lead to greater deployment of RES-E through clearer and more rapid 
planning procedures, which can be stemmed by smaller scale investors [78,89]. Such procedures 
would also benefit large-scale projects, which compete more directly with fossil fuels. Many RES-E 
projects, however, can be scaled down to units economically feasible for small investors. This could 
lead to a larger investor base, which in turn can improve community participation and acceptance  
(see Section 3.4.) and possibly lead to more liquidity and thus a lower return on investment required to 
access bank loans at low interest (see Section 3.3.).  
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To improve inappropriately designed planning institutions for example those in the past in France or 
Greece [5,106,107] many more detailed measures are conceivable. For example administrative charges 
can be reduced, more transparent guidelines be given, environmental impact assessments be more 
standardized, shorter minimum response periods for planning authorities be introduced and clear 
responsibilities be given to planning authorities, combined with a one-stop contact point for applicants. 
Many such initiatives have been taken at various levels in the EU, but are not implemented in all 
member states [105,106]. 
Increased RES-E deployment and a growing RES-E industry require stable legal  
environments and credible support schemes and explicit long-term targets credibly backed by the 
government [31,49,91,108]. Backing by governments, stability of support schemes and legal security 
has been mixed across the EU [105] and could be improved in the future, especially when member 
states also credibly commit to each other. 
4. Grids 
4.1. Lack of Network Capacity 
4.1.1. Definition of Barriers 
Grid extension has not caught up with the boost of RES-E capacities and quantities. Existing grids 
are increasingly reaching their capacities in transmitting RES-E [109]. A lack of network capacity can 
become a barrier to new projects. Furthermore, even if capacity is available, significant cost of 
network connection, in particular for offshore wind, can be a significant barrier to RES-E deployment 
if it has to be financed by project developers [109].  
The transformation towards an electricity system with high shares of RES-E requires significant 
transmission network expansion. The European transmission system operators project a need for 
35,300 km of new lines until 2020. 20,000 km are driven by RES-E integration (part of these lines also 
serve other objectives such as security of supply or European Market Integration [110]). The projected 
investment costs are €23–28 billion [110]. Offshore grids are projected to cost an additional  
€70–80 billion [111].  
One part of the problem is that good locations of RES-E are often located in rural and peripheral 
areas. In Germany, for example, good wind sites are located mostly in the North while most load 
centres are in the South and West. This requires power to be transported over large distances and is 
projected to cause transmission congestion if lines are not expanded [110].  
Similarly, distribution networks require massive investments to accommodate decentralized RES-E 
since networks have not been built to feed electricity back to higher voltage levels; conventional plants 
usually feed in directly to high-voltage levels [112]. 
Two further problems are associated with the fact that network investments are carried out by 
regulated network operators and refunded via network charges. First, regulation has to provide sufficient 
investment incentives which might not be the case under incentive regulation, the current dominant 
regulatory scheme (see Section 4.3.). Second, investments should be efficient. Network operators need 
incentives to avoid unnecessary investments. Otherwise, customers, who finally pay for investments 
Energies 2012, 5              
 
333
via network charges, will be unduly burdened. Furthermore, in the sense of achieving high shares of 
RES-E in the power system, those lines that bring most renewable capacity online should be built first.  
A coordination problem between network and generators further aggravates network planning. The 
investment need triggered by new connections is dependent on the network topology. While some sites 
trigger investments, location at others can defer investment needs. An example can be local generation 
that fulfils local demand and thereby avoids the need to supply from distant generators over a 
congested line. Optimal network investment depends on generator locations [32,37,38,113]. A lack of 
coordination may lead to suboptimal investments.  
Efficient network investment becomes even more important when investment need is high and 
construction of new lines additionally suffers from other problems such as investment incentives under 
regulation (see Section 4.3.), a lack of social acceptance (see Section 3.4.) and complex permitting 
procedures (see Section 3.5.) [110]. These restrictions at the network level draw into question whether 
the RES-E quantities necessary to reach EU targets can actually be provided within the short term. 
4.1.2. Policy Review 
RES-E support policy ensures generator network access (guaranteed connection, see also 
Section 4.3.). This is accompanied by an obligation of the network operator to expand the network in 
case capacity is insufficient to fulfil RES-E connection request or in cases where RES-E generation 
needs to be curtailed (see Section 4.2.). Such unconditional network expansion might be inefficiently 
expensive [114] and thereby hinder more beneficial investments. 
The problem roots in a lacking system perspective both on the generation and the network side. 
Generation, demand, and network are interconnected. Effects of new connections depend on the local 
network conditions and can be either positive or negative [115]. Obviously there might be a trade-off 
between location quality from the generator perspective and the network perspective.  
On the network side, scenarios that calculate required network extensions to fulfil renewable 
deployment targets can indicate such trade-offs between different network-generation constellations 
(see Section 6.1.). They are crucial for efficient system development and prioritization of investments 
and provide guidance to network operators.  
On the generation side, network cost allocation is an important market based instrument to guide 
network connection and utilization. Both connection fees and system charges (if applied to generators) 
can be used to promote RES-E investments where its social value is highest, e.g., close to load centres. 
Network operators are required to connect RES-E (guaranteed grid access, see Section 4.3.), but 
network charges can be a tool to direct connections to more suitable places from the network 
perspective and thereby reduce the required investments [116,117]. Differentiated network charges  
can even promote distributed generation (DG) projects by rewarding their potential benefits for  
the system [118].  
Network charges include connection charges recovering the investment cost for the connection and 
use of system charges that recover the operational network cost. Connection charges can be shallow or 
deep. While the first allocates only direct connection cost to the connectee, the latter also passes on 
costs that result from the connection deeper in the network such as upgrading a transformer. Deep 
charges are considered more cost-reflective. However, they are fraught with serious problems concerning 
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the determination of non-discriminatory fair charges [119]. Most European countries today apply 
shallow charging, but some countries still apply variants of deep charging. While this is sometimes 
seen as a measure to signal network scarcity to generators, it may unfairly hinder RES-E projects. This 
is particularly the case if charges are intransparent or subject to negotiation, as for example in Austria 
or Greece [120]. From this perspective, shallow charges should be preferred. Guaranteed feed-in, 
priority access rules and other feed-in regulation should acknowledge the fact that it is not necessarily 
efficient to dimension grid access to net installed capacity, e.g., of a wind farm, if full load is only 
reached during few hours of a year. Curtailment of a few per cent of annual production makes sense if 
in turn grid investments can be significantly reduced. Implementation can be, e.g., via voluntary 
agreements between network and RES-E operators that compensate curtailment where it is allowed by 
the institutional framework [121,122]. 
For shallow charges, the cost for grid investments has to be recovered via network use of system 
charges from generators and consumers. Some countries charge both generators and load, e.g., in the 
case of UK with a distribution of 27:73, the so called generation-load-split [123]. Charges for 
transmission use of system in the UK are already locationally differentiated; for distribution locational 
signals are currently introduced [124]. In Germany, however, generators are not subject to system 
charges [125]. This gives away a potential element to send signals on available network capacity to 
generators. In general, the degree to which network operators can use network charging to steer 
connections is limited today [117]. 
4.2. Intermittency, Controllability and Securing Peak Capacity 
4.2.1. Definition of Barriers 
Non-interrupted supply, power quality and stable frequency are public goods in the electricity 
system. Renewable energy supply is intermittent and dependent on external factors such as wind 
speeds and solar radiation. The volatility of RES-E supply in combination with reduced controllability 
of RES-E, particularly if generated by wind turbines or photovoltaics, is nonetheless highlighted as a 
major drawback. Growing shares of RES-E raise two problems: 
x Matching supply and demand (market level—hourly perspective): In periods with high RES-E 
generation, supply may exceed demand, creating negative electricity prices in the spot  
market [126]. On the other hand, costly back-up capacity has to be held available for periods 
with low RES-E generation. Thus, RES-E volatility reduces the predictability of energy supply 
and increases the costs of electricity generation. This market based perspective focuses on 
hourly balance.  
x Safe network operation: With preferred grid access of renewables, grid operators are challenged 
by peak renewable input. The additional variability at the production side is a challenge for 
securing stable voltage across grids. To accommodate unpredicted fluctuations, grid operators 
need to provide increased reserve power on the balancing market. In periods of very high  
feed-in, electricity supply may occasionally exceed the amount that can be safely absorbed 
while still maintaining adequate reserves and dynamic control in the system; energy production 
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may need to be curtailed. This system operation perspective focuses on the balance of supply 
and demand on a second to minute basis. 
A RES-E high electricity system requires higher degrees of flexibility to average out generator 
fluctuations. A lack of flexibility can therefore become a barrier for RES-E growth. A further problem 
is the limited recognition of RES-E contributions to power system stability and security in network  
security standards [118]. 
4.2.2. Policy Review 
Variability in the electricity system is not a new phenomenon. Operators are skilled in handling 
predicted and unpredicted fluctuations in demand (e.g., an extra-time in a World-Cup final). With 
increased forecast quality of renewable energy supply in both hourly and day-ahead time frames, 
operators can control fluctuating energy supply more easily. Local variations in energy supply are 
averaged out on a system-wide level, provided that transmission capacity is sufficiently high. Still, 
problems may occur at the local level. Storage capacities (pumped storage, heat pumps, water supply 
reservoirs) and demand-side management can accommodate peaks in energy generation and also enable 
distribution network operators to securely manage local imbalances (see Section 5.) [126].  
First steps are made to incorporate RES-E into system management and ancillary services. This 
includes granting network operators certain control rights on generators. System operators are allowed 
to deviate from priority access for RES-E for stability. However, they have to take corrective measures 
to avoid curtailments and report those actions to the regulatory authority reasons [127]. A further 
instrument to improve network integration of RES-E is demanding technical minimum requirements 
from generators. Sufficiently stringent specifications are required to allow the system to operate safely 
and securely even at high RES-E penetration rates. At the generator side, specifications should not be 
prohibitively costly since RES-E generators are often much smaller than traditional synchronous 
generators and different technology makes it more difficult to fulfil certain specifications (e.g., 
photovoltaics installations that produce DC power). Some countries require RES-E installations  
to fulfil minimum standards regarding controllability and system stabilizing capabilities (e.g.,  
Germany for wind, new combined-heat-and-power installations [128] and with the new FIT also for 
photovoltaics). Installations that decide not to install the respective technology are not entitled to 
receive a FIT. This is a pragmatic, low transaction cost solution to enable network operators to manage 
the increasingly complex system and thereby helps to bring the capacities on line. 
Market integration of RES-E can also be promoted by the design of support schemes for RES-E 
generation. For FITs, premium tariffs, which are paid to RES-operators in addition to electricity 
market price, are usually preferred over fixed tariffs, which are irrespective of the prevailing electricity 
price. Premium tariffs require operators of RES-E plants to market their electricity and are therefore 
expected to ease the transition towards an electricity market without RES-E support [5,129]. Moreover, 
they set incentives for a higher demand orientation of RES-E generation where possible [130]. In the 
UK, in the context of the Electricity Market Reform Package, premium tariffs and contracts for 
differences are currently discussed to support low carbon generation [131,132]. However, there may be 
important trade-offs with respect to other barriers. Compared to fixed tariffs, premium tariffs  
increase transaction costs and reduce investment certainty. Thus, they are less suited to overcome  
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capital-market restrictions (see Section 3.2.) and acceptance problems (see Section 3.4.) associated 
with RES-E generation [108,129,133,134]. This is empirically reflected in higher RES-E deployment 
costs, which were found, for example, to be 10–40% higher under a premium tariff than under a fixed 
tariff from 2004 to 2006 in Spain [108]. Consequently, premium tariffs should only be considered for 
RES-E technologies which can actually respond to time-variable price signals, such as biomass or 
hydro power, while for unresponsive technologies like solar and wind a fixed tariff is preferable. The 
exposure to time-variable market prices will not have a sufficiently positive effect to offset the 
increased transaction and risk costs of a premium [135]. However, premium tariffs can be specifically 
designed to mimic most properties of fixed tariffs without losing their market integration appeal. The 
premium can be allowed to increase with decreasing electricity prices, as in the Netherlands, or be 
coupled with a price floor and cap, as in Spain [130]. Alternatively, or for a transition period, RES-E 
generators could also be allowed to choose between both approaches (as in Spain) [133]. 
4.3. Market Power and Regulation  
4.3.1. Definition of Barriers 
Transmission networks are natural monopolies, due to economics of scale and scope and because of 
the physical properties of electricity that require network management to be integrated for stability 
reasons. To prevent the abuse of market power, monopolist network operators are usually regulated. 
Since transmission capacity, connection policies, system management, and grid codes are crucial for 
the deployment of RES-E, appropriate regulation is key for the success of renewable energy integration. 
On the one hand, vertically integrated companies that own both generation assets and the network 
have an incentive to use grid access policies as an entrance barrier for new competitors, including 
RES-E. Thus insufficient regulation can be a barrier to RES-E deployment. In the European Union, 
electricity generation and transmission were undertaken by vertically integrated monopolies until the 
1980s. Since the 1990s, policy makers have made considerable effort to solve this issue, but further 
steps might be needed [136]. 
On the other hand, due to geographical specificity (see Section 4.1.) and intermittency (see 
Section 4.2.), a RES-E-heavy electricity system has different demands towards the network than a 
conventional system, e.g., a different topology and different approaches toward stability and 
management. The transformation of the network requires large investments and new and unproven 
technologies. Consequently, a regulatory framework is needed that supports investments and 
innovation, while existing regulation often focuses on efficient operation [137]. Thus, the wrong 
regulatory approach can also be a barrier to RES-E. 
4.3.2. Policy Review 
Two major policies have been applied to ensure that grid access policies are not used as entrance 
barriers for RES-E. First, as part of the third energy package, the European Union pushed for unbundling 
generators from network operators [136]. But even under successful unbundling, established contacts 
between grid operators and large utilities may still favour the latter. Second, RES-E generators were 
granted guaranteed connection and priority feed-in. The latter has been recently incorporated into 
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European legislation [127]. Also, network operators are required to publish timelines for processing 
connection requests, which reduces uncertainty. Taken together, these policies seem to be quite 
efficient measures to avoid discrimination, but they need to be applied consistently throughout Europe, 
which is currently not the case: Significant obstacles remain and the EU still finds that “in general, 
average lead times for grid connection were very high representing a significant bottleneck” [105].  
The second barrier, the type of regulatory framework itself, has received much less attention from 
policy makers up to now. Incentive regulation, which is the dominant regulatory approach today, has 
been developed in the context of existing grids with limited investment need. The focus of incentive 
regulation lies in efficient operation of an existing network. In view of the large grid investments 
required for RES-E integration and the strong need for innovative technologies such as DC lines, sea 
cables, smart grids, but also new approaches to voltage support and regulating power, this might 
become a barrier for RES-E development. For example, traditional regulation of investment often does 
not account appropriately for the risk due to new technologies. Hence, new approaches aim to advance 
the regulatory framework to promote sufficiently large investments and set the right incentives to 
innovate and to apply new technologies [138,139]. This may include adding elements to the existing 
incentive regulation such as an investment or innovation bonus or granting higher returns to account 
for the risk of less well established technologies. Furthermore, policy should support new technologies 
as providers of ancillary services and lower entrance barriers to ancillary service markets for RES-E 
generators, consumers, and other technologies. 
Additionally, instruments outside regulation may be needed to foster R&D such as the low carbon 
network fund in the UK. In the long run, a redesign of the regulatory approach may be necessary to 
take account for the aim of achieving a low carbon electricity system. The UK has made this step with 
the implementation of the RIIO model (Revenue = Incentives + Innovation + Outputs). This new 
regulatory approach includes sustainability as objective and recognizes a high need for system 
transformation [140]. However, the operationalization of the sustainability objective and the performance 
of the new regulatory system as well as of the electricity market reform that is underway have still to 
be seen. 
4.4. Cross-Border Externalities 
4.4.1. Definition of Barriers 
Transmission networks are usually managed by transmission system operators (TSOs) that are 
responsible for a certain geographical region (control area), typically of the size of countries or smaller. 
The system operators that own the network assets within the control area are legally responsible for 
frequency and voltage stability and uninterrupted supply, and decide upon investment in this region. 
They are typically regulated by national authorities. Due to locational specificity (see Section 4.1.) and 
the fluctuating patterns of solar radiation and wind (see Section 4.2.), RES-E-heavy systems require 
more long-distance transmission capacity beyond national borders and control areas (interconnectors). 
This poses two problems. 
In the past, TSOs have often looked at their area as a largely self-contained system. Interconnectors 
to neighbouring TSOs were meant to ensure supply in case of emergencies. Long-term investment 
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planning and system management procedures have to be made consistent across (several) TSOs. In 
other words, limited TSO cooperation can be a barrier for RES-R. 
Regulators are usually national authorities which plausibly can be expected to maximize national 
welfare. However, both national and cross-border transmission projects usually exhibit externalities 
that affect other countries. For example, increasing the capacity of a North-South line in Belgium most 
probably increases the possibility to transport electricity from North to South Germany. The main 
reason for externalities in electricity networks is that the electrical current is determined by Kirchhoff’s 
laws and can hardly be influenced by the system operator. That means that a larger in-feed of 
electricity in North Germany affects the flow on all lines in the synchronous area, and probably 
increases the North-South-flow through Belgium. Relaxing a bottleneck in Belgium thus allows a more 
efficient use of German lines, which is a positive externality. It is highly plausible that regulators do 
not take the external effects into account, and therefore underinvest in transmission. Since RES-E 
generation is more location-specific than conventional generation, and thus has to rely more on long-
distance transmission capacity, it is more affected by that externality. International (cross-border) 
transmission projects have the additional difficulty that even the direct benefits appear in more than 
one country. Thus national approaches to regulation are a barrier to RES-E deployment. 
4.4.2. Policy Review 
Continued cooperation between TSOs is needed to ensure consistency in long-term investment 
planning, allow market coupling and other forms of market integration, and make grid codes 
compatible to facility cross-border trade of ancillary services. This process is under the way, with the 
industry association European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) 
playing an important role. Well known examples include the Ten-Year Network Development Plan. 
However, still much remains to be done [110] and incentives for increased cooperation need to  
be fostered. 
Not only TSOs need to cooperate, but also regulators and governments need to take an international 
perspective. National regulators maximizing national welfare ignore positive externalities and lead to 
underinvestment in interconnections. To ensure efficient transmission investment it is important to take 
benefits into account that occur outside the control area and outside the country where the investment 
takes place. The recently established Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER), the 
Council of European Energy Regulators (CEER) as well as direct EU funding for cross-border 
transmission projects are important first steps. What is needed, however, is a clear and explicit 
commitment of regulators to focus on European welfare instead of national welfare. To make this 
feasible, rules and procedures for redistributing benefits across control areas and countries need to be 
established. For example, if German generators and consumers benefit from transmission investments 
in Belgium, they should contribute to financing that investment. In the end an institutionally  
well-established European regulator might be needed. 
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5. Storage and Demand Response 
5.1. Economic Incentives 
5.1.1. Definition of Barriers 
A system with large share of fluctuating RES-E (see Section 4.2.) also requires more flexibility on 
the demand side. Today, the incentives to store electricity and adjust demand by reducing or shifting 
consumption over time are limited by two major barriers. First, price signals to consumers are weak. 
While wholesale prices change every hour, tariffs for small customers in most European countries are 
fixed for weeks to years, eliminating incentives to adjust consumption [141,142]. Furthermore, 
wholesale prices represent only 30–50% of household electricity prices, the rest being grid fees and 
taxes. These components do not fluctuate at all, although there are good reasons why they should. 
Empirical evidence as reviewed in [143] indicates that even household consumers respond considerably 
price-elastic. 
Second, demand response and storage applications can often provide significant power, but only 
limited energy volumes: they are “short-time applications”. That makes them well suited for ancillary 
service markets [144]. However, entrance barriers to these markets often prevent participation. Relevant 
barriers include the form of grid codes, ancillary service market design, market power in these markets, 
or regulation. 
5.1.2. Policy Review 
To foster price signals for consumers, three sets of policies are needed: First, the appropriate 
infrastructure needs to be in place (see Section 5.2.). Second, legal barriers to dynamic pricing such as 
price regulation should be removed [1]. Finally, making network charges and taxes time-variant, for 
example proportional to the spot price, would increase incentives significantly. It seems plausible to let 
the value added tax fluctuate with the price of the underlying good on logical grounds. Also, there is no 
good reason to apply a constant grid fee while costs are driven by infrastructure designed for  
peak demand.  
In addition, overcoming entrance barriers to balancing power markets can be an important means to 
support storage and demand applications. Improvements can be achieved by lowering the minimum 
bid size in balancing markets and adjusting pre-commitment requirements to incentivize demand side 
participation [145]. 
5.2. Lack of Communication Infrastructure 
5.2.1. Definition of Barriers 
Information and communication technologies are expected to support electricity systems with high 
shares of renewables and an active demand side. Smart meters (which enable advanced functionalities 
such as real-time pricing and remote meter reading; they may also enable more functions such as 
remote control or visualization of consumption profiles) and communication infrastructure provide for 
bi-directional information exchange and enable new services such as dynamic pricing or demand side 
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management that support a flexible electricity system. These developments are commonly referred to 
as smart grids.  
One barrier for the development of smart grids and the activation of the demand side can be the lack 
of smart meters since these are considered prerequisite for the introduction of time-variant pricing. At 
the same time, the absence of dynamic tariffs prevents the roll-out of smart meters [1]. But there is a 
more fundamental barrier to infrastructure development. Similar to generation technologies, knowledge 
spillovers may also result in suboptimal investment in metering and grid technologies and in smart 
appliances. Moreover, these technologies are also characterized by increasing returns, i.e., costs are 
relatively high at the moment but likely to decrease as the production of smart meters increases or the 
number of users of the underlying communication network rises [146].  
Finally, there may also be institutional limits to storage and demand response. The classical 
investor-user dilemma in the housing sector, which has often been highlighted as an important barrier 
to energy-efficiency investments—split incentives between landlords who invest in energy technologies 
and tenants who pay for electricity bills—is also likely to hinder the adoption of demand-side storage 
and management technologies [147].  
5.2.2. Policy Review 
A large set of policies can support infrastructure roll-out, from appropriate network regulation to 
smart meter requirements, R&D funding, and industry standardization. Up to now, instruments to 
support storage and demand response are rare. Some support comes within the framework of smart 
grids. European and national R&D programs support smart grid research (e.g., Framework Programme 
7 allocates €1.5 billion to smart grids microsystems and corresponding information and communication 
technologies, and electro-mobility), and several pilot projects have been realized (e.g., CELL project, 
FENIX, e-Energy). The step from pilot to large-scale realization is still missing. Furthermore, the focus 
of the different projects varies widely from distribution automation over dynamic pricing to demand side 
management. Smart meters as a sub-part of smart grids are supported in the EU’s third energy package 
that aims to “encourage the introduction of intelligent metering systems” [148]. Some countries opted 
for a complete roll-out of smart meters (e.g., Italy, Sweden) while others have not (e.g., Germany). 
Even though smart meter technology can be used to make the entire system more efficient, the network 
and system benefits seem to be insufficiently on the agenda (for the Netherlands and Great Britain 
network issues did play a role in motivating role out; in Sweden and Italy network issues did not seem 
to play a relevant role [149]). Split incentives remain a problem. 
If the barriers and market failures mentioned cannot be removed, it can be efficient to rely on 
second-best policies and support demand response and storage directly through subsidies. These 
incentives could be combined with the RES-E support scheme to motivate plant operators to provide 
flexibility along with the intermittent power source. As important as correct incentives is probably 
support for the development of communication infrastructure as a precondition for storage and demand 
response. Smart meters, intelligent distribution grids, or e-mobility infrastructure may need direct 
support since market based roll-out may be rather slow [149].  
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6. Integration of the Electricity System 
The previous assessment of RES-E policies in the EU has provided two insights: (1) policies have 
been implemented rather uncoordinated, but with a clear focus on generation; and (2) policy design 
and implementation have been primarily within the responsibility of Member States under an only 
weak and rough common EU framework. A much stronger integration of RES-E policies both across 
the EU and across the sectors (generation, grid, and storage and demand response) is required for 
integrated infrastructure provision (also overcoming cross-border grid externalities) and geographically 
efficient renewable energy deployment. An EU-wide coordination of RES-E support schemes can 
realize cost-saving potentials from clustering RES-E installations at beneficial sites throughout the EU. 
In the following, two important measures will be discussed, which should form part of such a planning 
approach: (1) A European Scenario for the electricity system and (2) a EU-wide harmonisation of 
RES-E policies. 
6.1. A European Scenario for the Electricity System 
A European scenario for the electricity system should comprise consistent and spatially explicit 
projections for electricity demand and supply with detailed deployment plans for each renewable 
source, storage capacities, flexibility measures and grid expansion—both within and across member 
states. It has to be detailed on the short term (one to five years), but must also incorporate a long-term 
view (15–20 years) to identify bottlenecks and opportunities at an early stage and help prevent 
stranded investments. In this way, the scenario reveals needs for investment and new policy 
instruments at an early stage. The detailed deployment plans can be realized through a FIT with a 
breathing cap (see Section 3.1.2.).  
How to choose and develop the European scenario? Starting from a range of possible scenarios with 
different assumptions on major decision variables, such as the implementation of transnational 
integration or the approach of variability-balancing, the adequate scenario has to be identified by the 
governments through trading off the respective pros and cons. Widespread endorsement will only be 
achieved if the scenario development process is transparent, rests on a solid scientific basis and 
moreover allows for participation of all stakeholders. As the process has to be continuously updated 
whenever new information on technical developments or cost parameters becomes available, it might 
be useful to institute a special agency dedicated to scenario development. 
The necessity for a clearly defined, independent and transparent process can be exemplified on the 
German experience of projecting future grid requirements. This is currently accomplished by a small 
agency that outsources the calculations of future scenarios and grid requirements to the incumbent 
energy companies and grid operators [150], thus risking conflicts of interest. The resulting studies are 
criticised for their lack of transparency [151]: Neither detailed data nor modelling procedures are made 
public which disables any scientific review. Also, the study is based on a short-term view without 
considering the long-term RES-E-targets and hardly accounts for the European dimension. 
An EU planning agency could deliver such a scenario. Currently, most Member States have 
differently structured energy markets and regulating authorities, and have their own ideas on future 
energy markets. A pragmatic way towards an EU-wide energy scenario would be the development of 
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national scenarios in each member state within the consistent framework outlined above. The national 
authorities developing the scenarios should focus on strong coordination and collaboration between 
each other, so that the scenarios are coherent across the EU. The EU planning agency could then bring 
the scenarios together and foster harmonisation of these scenarios, and also suggest integrated  
EU-wide scenarios. 
6.2. Harmonisation of Policies 
Based on the chosen scenario, the common EU framework for RES-E policies can be advanced. 
The policy process has to account for positive as well as negative effects of EU-wide policy 
harmonisation and result in a feasible compromise. This is discussed here exemplarily for RES-E 
generation. A harmonisation of remuneration rules for RES-E generation may increase the  
cost-effectiveness of RES-E support. It creates a larger uniform market for the deployment of RES-E 
technologies, enabling economies of scale. It can lead to an optimized spatial allocation of RES-E 
plants with clusters in particularly beneficial areas (photovoltaics in the south, wind turbines in coastal 
areas of the north), which reduces generation costs. Moreover, it may allow for an EU-wide  
burden-sharing of remuneration costs [5,129,152–154]. However, there are also limits to harmonisation. 
Most importantly, possible trade-offs between efficiency gains from centralized generation and 
additional costs associated with grid extension and long-distance transmission have to be considered. 
Potential gains cannot be realized as long as cross-border grid capacities are insufficient and the  
EU-wide electricity market is not properly liberalized and integrated [108]. In addition, an EU-wide 
harmonisation disregards national and local benefits of RES-E generation, such as national supply 
security and regional economic development [5,129]. Finally, harmonisation efforts may even hinder 
the deployment of RES-E. Large-scale centralized generation may increase opposition against RES-E 
installations (see Section 3.4.). The transition period necessary for harmonisation also increases 
investment uncertainties [5,155]. Consequently, harmonising basic principles and methodologies for 
designing remuneration schemes is better than harmonising in detail, e.g., the actual level of 
remuneration for a specific technology. 
7. A Transition to Sustained Carbon Lock-Out 
A European carbon lock-out characterised by RES-E deployment requires coordinated action at 
multiple levels [156], involving the removal of the barriers with the policies listed in Table 1.  
It would be part of a larger socio-technical transition with uncertain trajectories of institutional and 
technological change, but also windows of opportunity [157,158]. To create momentum, opportunity 
for entrepreneurial [159] and policy learning [160] needs to be ensured [161], which is needed because 
we do not have enough knowledge about future policy challenges of RES-E deployment [162]. The 
transition to RES-E would be a bumpy road, if we do not align policies and networked technology 
niches to match generation of RES-E with demand, storage and capacities of grids and other 
infrastructure [163]. 
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Table 1. Specific barriers constituting a carbon lock-in and corresponding policies. 
 Barrier constituting 
carbon lock-in 
Policies in place Policies for carbon lock-out 
G
en
er
at
io
n 
Learning and knowledge 
spillovers 
x Feed-in tariffs or quotas x Feed-in tariff (substituting quotas) 
with Breathing Cap  
Capital market restrictions x Feed-in tariffs or quotas x Feed-in tariff (substituting quotas) 
Uneven political playing 
field 
x None 
x Tighten the of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme 
x Implement a price collar for the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme 
x Phase-out fossil-fuel subsidies 
x Spur market liberalisation 
x Feed-in tariffs as second-best means 
Community acceptance x None 
x Foster local ownership (e.g., by  
feed-in tariffs rather than quotas) 
x Transparent and participative 
planning and decision-making 
x Clear and participative zoning 
Planning consent and 
policy commitment 
x Attempts to handle planning more 
clearly and quickly 
x One-stop contact points for investors 
x Brief and binding approval periods 
x Governments endorsing explicit 
deployment scenarios 
G
ri
ds
 
Lack of network capacity x Partially deep connection charges 
x Shallow connection charges plus 
differentiated network use of system 
charges to provide locational signals 
Intermittency, 
controllability and 
securing peak capacity 
x Technical requirements 
x Feed-in tariffs with premiums for 
certain technologies 
x Voluntary curtailment agreements 
Market power and 
regulation 
x Unbundling 
x Priority network access 
x Timelines for processing 
connection request 
x Regulation of efficient operation 
x Stronger regulatory incentives for 
investment and innovation 
Cross-border externalities 
x Cooperative planning of European 
transmission networks by operators 
x First attempts of cooperation 
between national regulators 
x Foster cooperation between national 
regulators 
St
or
ag
e 
an
d 
D
em
an
d Economic Incentives x None 
x Dynamic electricity pricing 
x Time-variant grid fees and taxes 
x Lower entrance barriers to ancilliary 
markets, e.g., smaller bid size in 
balancing markets 
Technology x Support for pilot projects x Large-scale support for infrastructure 
development 
Coordinated scenario development would help to create shared expectations among actors [164] and 
can facilitate investment and policy development at all levels from micro-generation to grid 
interconnectors. Accompanying activities are needed to create “self-fulfilling prophecies” [165,166]: 
Advocates of RES-E have to increase their efforts to bring stakeholders together to plan the transition 
to a RES-E grid and storage infrastructure. Second, well-designed deployment-responsive FITs 
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(“breathing cap”) automatically adjust the incentives according to deployment, thus increasing the 
likelihood of achieving the target scenario. Efforts have to be increased to encourage generation of 
RES-E in areas, where its deployment is limited, although potentially viable. FITs in combination with 
cheap loans and tax benefits to investors and local authorities seem particularly successful onshore, 
whereas offshore better surety for capital outlays and facilitation of planning permission seem 
paramount. Where RES-E is largely unknown or new technologies are to be tested, pilot projects could 
be considered. But participation of all potential advocates should be ensured to improve acceptance 
and encourage formation of more localized advocacy coalitions and networks of expertise that drive 
the transition to carbon lock-out. Attention should be given that these networks do not  
lock-in and discourage creativity [167]. 
At lower levels exchange among advocates can lead to technology, business and policy 
experimentation, which may diffuse as contextualized “best-practice” learning across Europe [168].  
At higher levels, advocacy coalitions and emerging experts are likely to influence the politics of  
RES-E provisioning and larger scale investments into grids, storage and basic research [169]. 
Especially those, who are locally benefitting from generating RES-E, are likely to have vested interest 
in transforming national and trans-European grids and storage infrastructure to facilitate greater 
throughput of RES-E. They can push necessary investments. The emergence of expertise and advocacy 
networks can be sped up through facilitated exchange across Europe, e.g., by conferences, study tours, 
open-days or hearings. There is much to be learned from localised adjustments to grids and FIT 
systems, including the decision-making procedures on tariffs and developing technology. The match of 
infrastructure and storage with supply and demand of RES-E will be critical for sustained carbon  
lock-out. Pilot projects at smaller scale with more localized actors could be first steps for learning. 
Knowledge gained from such activities is strategically very valuable, as the last twenty years of RES-E 
deployment have shown [170]. At the national and European level, however, oversight, facilitation and 
exchange have to be ensured to avoid uneven costs and benefits of RES-E provision and distribution 
across Europe. Facilitators could be government departments, non-governmental organisations, 
researchers and RES-E business associations, but also individual entrepreneurs. Instead of working 
against each other, carbon lock-out requires concerted action of advocates at all levels, whilst allowing 
sufficient degrees of experimentation to capture future opportunities and to sustain the transition to full 
deployment of renewable electricity across Europe. To facilitate this transition, we have examined the 
barriers and how they could be overcome. Many areas require further research. In the meantime the 
ball is with other advocates. 
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